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I. Introduction
Traditionally, privacy violations have been understood as invasive
actions by particular wrongdoers who cause direct injury to victims.
Victims experience embarrassment, mental distress, or harm to their
reputations. Privacy is not infringed until these mental injuries materialize.
Thus, the law responds when a person’s deepest secrets are exposed,
reputation is tarnished, or home is invaded. Under the traditional view,
privacy is an individual right, remedied at the initiative of the individual.
This way of understanding privacy and the manner in which it should
be protected is being severely challenged by the privacy problems arising
in today’s Information Age. These are problems involving the flow of
information: the construction of detailed digital dossiers about people; the
increasing accessibility of personal information; the growing use of
personal information to make important decisions affecting people’s lives;
the widespread transfer of information between a variety of entities; the
burgeoning expansion in different uses for personal data; and the emerging
collaboration between private sector entities gathering personal data and
government law enforcement officials. These problems are of a different
character than traditional privacy problems, and they must be
conceptualized and protected against differently.
Protecting privacy starts with conceptualizing privacy. We need to
understand the nature of privacy problems in order to solve them. In this
article, I contend that many of these emerging privacy problems must be
understood “architecturally” as part of a larger social and legal structure.
Consequently, protecting privacy must focus not merely on remedies and
penalties but on shaping architectures. I argue that many of the privacy
problems posed by the Information Age cannot adequately be remedied by
individual rights and remedies alone.
In Part II, I employ the notion of architecture to describe a different
way of understanding certain privacy problems and how the law should
protect against them.
In Part III, I illustrate these points with the example of identity theft,
one of the most rapidly growing types of criminal activity.1 A criminal
impersonates an individual by using personal data to obtain accounts, credit
cards, and loans. This upends a person’s life, destroys her credit, and often
prevents her from engaging in important activities such as making
purchases, obtaining loans or mortgages, renting an apartment, or even
getting a job or license.

1. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Identity Thieves Thrive in Information Age; Rise of Online
Data Brokers Makes Criminal Impersonation Easier, WASH. POST, May 31, 2001, at A1.
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Identity theft is often conceptualized as the product of disparate
thieves and crafty criminals. The problem, however, has not been
adequately conceptualized, and, as a result, enforcement efforts have been
misdirected. The problem, as I contend, is one created by an architecture
that is deeply flawed. Understanding identity theft in terms of architecture
reveals that it is part of a larger problem that the law has thus far ignored.

II. Architecture and the Protection of Privacy
A.

The Traditional Model

The question of how to protect privacy was of paramount importance
to Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890, when they wrote their
profoundly influential article, The Right to Privacy.2 The authors raised
great concern about new technologies for photography which would make
taking photographs significantly easier and cheaper.3 These technological
developments intersected with a rapidly growing press, which was
becoming increasingly sensationalistic. “Of the desirability—indeed of the
necessity—of some such protection [of privacy], there can, it is believed,
be no doubt.”4 The problem facing Warren and Brandeis was that the
common law in 1890 did not provide much protection for privacy.
Around the same time Warren and Brandeis wrote their article, E.L.
Godkin, a famous social commentator of his day,5 also observed that
privacy was being endangered by the excessive exploits of the press.
Godkin was not optimistic about the possibility of a legal solution to these
new threats to privacy:
In truth, there is only one remedy for the violations of the right to
privacy within the reach of the American public, and that is but an
imperfect one. It is to be found in attaching social discredit to
invasions of it on the part of conductors of the press. At present this
check can hardly be said to exist.6

Unlike Godkin, Warren and Brandeis believed that law could solve
these privacy problems. Warren and Brandeis argued that existing legal
causes of action did not adequately protect privacy but that legal concepts
in the common law could be modified to protect privacy effectively. The
common law had the necessary foundations for protecting privacy, for it
2. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
3. Id. at 195–96.
4. Id. at 196.
5. See Elbridge L. Adams, The Right to Privacy and its Relation to the Law of Libel, 39 AM.
L. REV. 37 (1905); Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1
(1979).
6. E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen: IV. To His Own Reputation, SCRIBNER’S
MAGAZINE, 1890, at 67; see also E.L. Godkin, The Right to Privacy, THE NATION, Dec. 25,
1890, at 496–97.
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“secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what
extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to
others.”7 This right “is merely an instance of the enforcement of a more
general right of the individual to be let alone.”8 From this more general
right, the authors concluded, protections against privacy violations could be
derived in the common law.9
What Warren and Brandeis achieved was nothing short of
magnificent. By pulling together various isolated strands of the common
law, the authors demonstrated that the law contained the seeds of remedies
for privacy invasions. They illustrated why creating these remedies would
not constitute a radical addition to the common law but would merely be an
extension and an elaboration of what was already germinating.10
Warren and Brandeis discussed three remedies to protect privacy.
First, they contended that invasions of privacy should give rise to “[a]n
action of tort for damages in all cases.”11 Regarding damages, “[i]f the
invasion of privacy constitutes a legal injuria, the elements for demanding
redress exist, since already the value of mental suffering, caused by an act
wrongful in itself, is recognized as a basis for compensation.”12 Therefore,
Warren and Brandeis’s primary enforcement mechanism consisted of tort
damages to compensate individuals for the “mental suffering” caused by
privacy invasions. Second, in a “very limited class of cases,” an injunction
might be appropriate.13 Third, with legislation, criminal penalties can be
imposed “within narrower limits.”14
Warren and Brandeis’s understanding of privacy problems has been
highly influential in the development of privacy law, and I will refer to this
understanding as the “traditional model.” Under this model, privacy is
understood as a series of discrete wrongs to specific individuals. These
wrongs occur through the actions of particular wrongdoers. The injury is
experienced by the individuals who are wronged. For example, a privacy
violation that would fit well into the traditional model is a newspaper
publishing a photograph of a person in the nude. There is a particular
wrongdoer (the newspaper) that engages in a particular action (publishing
the photograph) which causes harm to a particular individual. This harm
consists of mental distress and any consequent physical or mental
impairment.

7. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 198.
8. Id. at 205.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 206, 213 n.1 (“The application of an existing principle to a new state of facts is not
judicial legislation.”).
11. Id. at 219.
12. Id. at 213.
13. Id. at 219.
14. Id.
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Under the traditional model, privacy protections safeguard against
these wrongs to individuals. Protection consists of rights and remedies for
each instance of harm, and in certain cases, criminal punishments for the
wrongdoers. Thus, the traditional model is reactive. It waits for harms to
materialize in concrete form and then reacts. The traditional model works
to prevent future harms through the deterrent effects of civil liability and
criminal penalties.
Another aspect of the traditional model is that it often views privacy
protections in the form of rights possessed and remedied at the initiative of
individuals. The value of protecting privacy is measured in terms of the
value of preventing harm to the individual. Privacy is treated as an
individual entitlement. In the words of one court, “[p]rivacy is inherently
personal. The right to privacy recognizes the sovereignty of the
individual.”15 According to the Restatement of Torts: “The right protected
by the action for invasion of privacy is a personal right, peculiar to the
individual whose privacy is invaded.”16 Under this view, privacy is
enforced by providing individuals with remedies for privacy invasions. For
example, each of the four privacy torts, inspired by Warren and Brandeis’
1890 article,17 affords a remedy to specific harms caused to specific
individuals. The tort of intrusion upon seclusion protects against the
intentional intrusion into an individual’s “solicitude or seclusion” or “his
private affairs or concerns.”18 The public disclosure of private facts tort
provides individuals with remedies against publicly revealing matters
concerning their private lives.19 The tort of false light protects individuals
against the dissemination of false information.20 And the tort of
appropriation protects individuals from the use of their name or likeness for
the benefit of another person or entity.21
The privacy torts are designed to redress specific harms. In many
cases however, damages are likely to be small, thus creating little incentive
to sue. The result is that privacy is most protected in situations where
damages can be defined palpably, such as where skeletons in the closet are
revealed, where nudity is publicly disclosed, or where the press sneaks into
a person’s home to obtain personal information.
Like tort law, criminal law focuses on specific wrongdoers. It aims to
deter crime by establishing penalties for privacy invasions. Criminal law is
often reactive, responding to crime with punishment after its occurrence.
Frequently, criminal law fails to be proactive in preventing crime.
Although criminal law certainly works to deter crime, some crimes are
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373, 376 (N.M.Ct. App. 1989).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I comment (a)(1977).
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
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difficult to deter. Criminal law can only reach a certain level of deterrence,
which can be limited by difficulties in catching and prosecuting the
perpetrators. Crimes involving the use and dissemination of personal
information present complicated enforcement problems, since these crimes
can occur from anywhere in the world, are easy to conceal, and take a long
time to detect.
Although the traditional model works for a number of privacy
problems, not all privacy problems are the same, and many privacy
problems do not fit well into this model. Elsewhere, I contended that
privacy is not a unitary concept.22 I argued that privacy cannot be
adequately conceptualized by isolating a common denominator in all of the
multifarious things we understand as implicating privacy. Instead, privacy
should be conceptualized from the bottom-up, by focusing on particular
problems which are related but do not necessarily share one element in
common. There are many different types of privacy problems, and
although related, they differ in significant ways.
The traditional model does not adequately account for many of the
privacy problems arising today. A number of privacy problems do not
consist merely of a series of isolated and discrete invasions or harms, but
are systemic in nature. Although I have argued that privacy must be
understood contextually and that privacy problems have differences which
should be more carefully examined,23 this does not mean that privacy is
invaded only through a series of singular incursions. In certain contexts,
the privacy harm is caused by a particular social or legal structure, not by a
few isolated actors.
Many modern privacy problems are systemic in nature. They are the
product of information flows, which occur between a variety of different
entities. There is often no single wrongdoer; responsibility is spread
among a multitude of actors, with a vast array of motives and aims, each
doing different things at different times. For example, when a person
unwittingly finds herself embroiled in a public news story, the invasiveness
of the media is often not the product of one particular reporter. Rather, the
collective actions of numerous reporters camping outside one’s home and
following one wherever she goes severely disrupt her life. The difficulty in
obtaining a legal remedy for this disruption is that no one reporter’s actions
may be all that invasive or objectionable. The harm is created by the
totality of privacy invasions, but the tort of intrusion upon seclusion only
focuses on each particular actor.24
Today, much modern information gathering occurs in piecemeal
fashion. A difficulty I have described as the “aggregation problem”
22. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1092 (2002).
23. Id. at 1126–43.
24. As Bruce Sanford contends: “A stake–out by a group of unrelated reporters should be
viewed as no more than the sum of its separate parts.” BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY
§ 11.2, at 541 (2d ed. 1991) (Supp. 2003).
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complicates the application of tort law in specific cases.25 In isolation, a
particular piece of information may not be very invasive of one’s privacy.
But when pieces of information are combined, they may form a detailed
account of an individual, what I have referred to as a “digital biography.”26
The whole may be greater than the sum of the parts. This phenomenon
occurs because information that is not revealing alone can be quite
revealing in combination with other pieces of information.
Further, the trade of personal information between private sector
entities today is not readily analogous to the widespread disclosure of
information by the media. Entities often buy and sell information, resulting
in the disclosure of that information to only a few other entities. It is
difficult to assess damages when one company maintains a database about
a person and sells that information to other companies or the government.27
These harms do not translate well to tort law or criminal law, which focus
on isolated actors and address harms individually rather than collectively.
The traditional view of privacy harms pervades much of the law of
information privacy. Courts often look for specific injuries. For example,
in U.S. West, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,28 the court
struck down regulations of the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) requiring that consumers opt-in before telecommunications
carriers could use or disclose their personal information. The court
reasoned that the governmental interest in protecting privacy was not
“substantial” because the government failed to “show that the
dissemination of the information desired to be kept private would inflict
specific and significant harm on individuals, such as undue embarrassment
or ridicule, intimidation or harassment, or misappropriation of sensitive
personal information for the purposes of assuming another’s identity.”29
This way of viewing the harm to privacy fails to acknowledge the larger
systemic problems involved with information flow. These problems affect
the type of world we are creating. As I have discussed at length elsewhere,
the growing use and dissemination of personal information creates a
Kafkaesque world of bureaucracy, where people are increasingly powerless
and vulnerable, where personal information is not only outside our control
25. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1184–95 (2002) [hereinafter Access]; Daniel J. Solove,
Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1393, 1434 (2001) [hereinafter Solove, Privacy].
26. See Access, supra note 25, at 1184–95.
27. Certain more modern privacy laws—namely, a number of the statutes passed since the
1970s—have minimum damages provisions, eliminating the difficult task of proving specific
harm. See, e.g., The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a) (1993)
(minimum $10,000 per violation); 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (West 1993) (liquidated damages of
$2500). Nevertheless, these laws often still suffer from other problems in the traditional model,
discussed below.
28. 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
29. Id. at 1234–35.
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but also is subjected to a bureaucratic process that is itself not adequately
controlled.30 This generalized harm already exists; we need not wait for
specific abuses to occur.
Enforcement at the initiative of the individual also creates difficulties.
Arguing from the traditional model, Fred Cate contends that although
people claim they desire more privacy, their actions illustrate that they do
not want to sacrifice much time or energy in obtaining it.31 The goal of the
law, says Cate, should be to assist those who want to protect their privacy
rather than to thrust a uniform wall of privacy around everyone: “The law
should serve as a gap-filler, facilitating individual action in those situations
in which the lack of competition has interfered with private privacy
protection.”32 Furthermore, according to Cate, the purpose of privacy
rights is to “facilitate . . . the development of private mechanisms and
individual choice as a means of valuing and protecting privacy.”33
However, many privacy problems cannot be adequately redressed by
relying on individual initiative alone. As Paul Schwartz argues, affording
individuals a right to control their personal data improperly assumes that
individuals have the ability to exercise meaningful control over their
information.34 Schwartz calls this problem the “autonomy trap.”35
Schwartz notes how consent screens on a website asking users to relinquish
control over information often do so on a “take-it-or-leave-it basis”
resulting in the “fiction” that people have “expressed informed consent to
[the website’s] data processing practices.”36 Stated more broadly, there are
a number of forces that prevent individuals from exercising their
preferences to protect their privacy.
For example, a person may want to purchase books from an online
bookseller. Suppose that the person’s privacy preferences consist of the
information being kept very secure, not being disclosed to the government,
and not being traded or disclosed to other companies (even in the event that
the company goes bankrupt). But the online bookseller’s privacy policy is
standardized and often does not address these points with any reasonable
degree of specificity. The policy contains a blanket statement that
information is kept secure, but there are not enough details for the person to
make an accurate assessment of the level of security. The policy says
nothing about the bookseller’s policies regarding government access to
personal information. If the bookseller were issued a subpoena for the
30. Solove, Privacy, supra note 25 at 1399.
31. FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 196 (1997).
32. Id. at 131.
33. Id.
34. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609,
1661–64 (1999) [hereinafter Privacy and Democracy]; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Internet
Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815 (2000) [hereinafter Internet].
35. Privacy and Democracy, supra note 34, at 1660.
36. Id. at 1662.
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person’s data, would the bookseller oppose it? Would the bookseller
inform the person beforehand? These questions are unanswered.37 Finally,
the policy says that in the event the company goes bankrupt, information
may be among the transferred assets. And since privacy policies are
remarkably similar among many companies, many other online bookstores
offer similar terms. If the person decides to purchase the book in a bricksand-mortar bookstore, she faces the same difficulties if she pays by credit
card.38 There, the privacy policies are not even readily available to the
purchaser. In short, there is not a lot of bargaining over privacy. This state
of affairs exists partly because there are not many choices available to
people regarding their privacy and because people are often not aware of
the problems, risks, and dangers about how their information is handled.
Even if they were, it is doubtful whether a person could create a special
deal with a company to provide greater protections for her privacy. With
regard to the level of privacy protection offered by companies, a person
must simply take it or leave it. People are not afforded enough choices to
exercise their privacy preferences. Because companies controlling personal
information are secretive about its uses and vague about their privacy
policies, people lack adequate knowledge to make meaningful choices.
Placing the onus on individuals to protect their privacy, as Cate
recommends, can only be effective if individuals have the power to
exercise their rights. Enforcement mechanisms that rely upon individual
initiative often fail because individuals lack the knowledge, power, and
resources to use them. Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye vividly illustrates
this point. The novel chronicles the tragic life of Pecola Breedlove, an
African-American girl growing up in a poor and abusive family. Pecola
considers herself ugly and dreams of having blue eyes. The Breedloves
live amid dinginess and squalor in an abandoned store, which they have
partitioned into rooms. The Breedloves are radically disempowered. All of
the rights and legal protections afforded to people in this country have little
effect on their lives. For example, the Breedloves purchase a new sofa,
which they receive in severely damaged condition. Cholly Breedlove,
Pecola’s father, futilely attempts to complain:
[The sofa] had been purchased new, but the fabric had been split
straight across the back by the time it was delivered. The store would
not take the responsibility. . . .

37. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1099–1100 (2002), for a discussion of the inadequacies of
privacy policies in informing people about government access to their personal information.
38. This is illustrated by Kenneth Starr’s subpoena of Kramerbooks for records about Monica
Lewinsky’s book purchases. See Felicity Barringer, Using Books as Evidence Against Their
Readers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at WK3. In that case, Kramerbooks decided to challenge the
subpoena, but the bookstore was not under any obligation to do so.
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”Looka here, buddy. It was O.K. when I put it on the truck. The store
can’t do anything about it once it’s on the truck. . . .” Listerine and
Lucky Strike breath.
”But I don’t want no tore couch if’n it’s bought new.” Pleading eyes
and tightened testicles.
”Tough shit, buddy. Your tough shit. . . .”
You could hate a sofa, of course—that is, you could hate a sofa. But
it didn’t matter. You still had to get together $4.80 a month. If you had
to pay $4.80 a month for a sofa that started off split, no good, and
humiliating—you couldn’t take any joy in owning it. And the
joylessness stank, pervaded everything. The stink of it kept you from
painting the beaverboard walls; from getting a matching piece of
material for the chair; even from sewing up the split, which became a
gash, which became a gaping chasm that exposed the cheap frame and
cheaper upholstery. It withheld the refreshment in a sleep slept on
it. . . .39

The Breedloves accept the torn couch even though it is clear that the
law affords them a remedy. However, the Breedloves are unaware of the
legal remedies they might have and they lack the ability to bring a lawsuit.
This example illustrates that rights, remedies, and legal protections can
only be effective if people have the power to use them. The Breedloves are
powerless because they have been trained to be powerless; they accept
whatever injustice comes their way because they have come to learn that
this is the lot life continually deals them.
In an interesting contrast, especially to Pecola, stands the character of
Maureen Peal. Maureen is a new African-American girl in Pecola’s school,
and she is nicely dressed, rich (relative to the other girls), popular, and selfconfident. Maureen has “enchanted the entire school” and has a “rich
autumn ripeness in her walk.”40 In one scene, Maureen describes an
instance where her uncle sued an ice cream store that refused to serve him:
”My uncle sued Isaley’s,” Maureen said to the three of us. “He sued
the Isaley’s in Akron. They said he was disorderly and that that was why
they wouldn’t serve him, but a friend of his, a policeman, came in and
beared the witness, so the suit went through.”
”What’s a suit?”
”It’s when you can beat them up if you want to and won’t anybody do
nothing. Our family does it all the time. We believe in suits.”41

In contrast to the Breedloves, Maureen Peal has considerable power
because she has a very different mindset. The Peal family members are
aware of their legal rights and are able to use the legal system effectively.
They have the financial resources to do so, as well as the assistance of a

39. TONI MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE 36 (1998).
40. Id. at 62.
41. Id. at 68.
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policeman whose testimony was essential to the success of Maureen’s
uncle’s lawsuit.
These scenes from The Bluest Eye illustrate a profound problem with
individual remedies—they are only effective to the extent that individuals
have power to exercise them. Individual remedies are often powerless in
the face of larger forces created by social structure. A person may have the
legal opportunity to bargain to modify a contract, lease, or employment
agreement or to sue for redress if wronged. But unless that person has the
knowledge and ability to bargain or to sue, the opportunities are often not
very empowering.
If we afford privacy rights, we must do so in a system where they can
be meaningfully exercised. Rights to consent to the collection of data also
lack much meaning if people can be readily pressured, mislead, or coerced
into relinquishing their information.42 Anita Allen notes that people readily
surrender their privacy, and privacy expectations are eroding.43 According
to Allen, “[p]rivacy is not an optional good” because it is a “precondition
for a liberal egalitarian society.”44 A legal system that enforces privacy
largely through individual rights and remedies will encounter significant
problems because of the difficulties for individuals to recognize the harms
of relinquishing control over the information and to have the power and
resources to exercise their rights.
Additionally, the traditional model’s focus on privacy invasions as
harms to specific individuals often overlooks the fact that certain privacy
problems are structural and affect not merely particular individuals but
society as a whole.45 Privacy cannot merely be enforced at the initiative of
particular individuals. Privacy, as Paul Schwartz contends, should be
viewed as a “constitutive value” because “access to personal information
and limits on it help form the society in which we live and shape our
individual identities.”46 Since certain privacy problems are structural in
nature, they affect more than specific aggrieved individuals. Social
structure has effects on an entire society. As Spiros Simitis aptly observes,
“privacy considerations no longer arise out of particular individual
problems; rather, they express conflicts affecting everyone.”47

42. See Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy, supra note 34, at 1660–64; Solove, Privacy,
supra note 25, at 1453–54.
43. Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723 (1999).
44. Id. at 740.
45. Solove, Privacy, supra note 25, at 1454–55.
46. Internet, supra note 34, at 834.
47. Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707,
709 (1987).
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Architecture

If we look at privacy more as an aspect of social and legal structure,
then we begin to see that certain types of privacy harms are systemic and
structural in nature, and we need to protect against them differently.
The concept of “architecture” is useful for understanding how certain
privacy problems should be understood and dealt with. The term
“architecture” typically refers to the design of spaces—of buildings or
cities. I use the term “architecture” in a broader way, similar to Lawrence
Lessig and Joel Reidenberg, who contend that architecture does not merely
Architecture can be
describe the design of physical structures.48
constructed through computer code; it is built into the very structure of the
Internet and other forms of electronic communication, and it shapes the
extent of liberty and control exercised over people in these media.49
Architecture emphasizes that legal and social structures are products
of design. Information collection, dissemination, and networking are
shaped by aspects of social and legal structure. Joel Reidenberg has long
pointed out that information networks have an architecture, which is
influenced not only by law but by technological considerations.50
Architecture is an effective way to describe the way privacy is protected or
diminished in our society, for the metaphor of architecture captures how
legal regulations— or the lack thereof—structure social interaction as well
as the degree of social control and freedom in a society.
Architecture does not merely structure life by direct physical
limitations that channel movement (walls, distance, divisions).
Architecture also alters perception by its aesthetic design, by what it
expresses. Frank Lloyd Wright observed that architecture is “the scientific
art of making structure express ideas.”51 Architecture creates certain
psychological and social effects. As Professor Yi-Fu Tuan observes,
architecture can “sharpen and enlarge consciousness.”52 “Architecture
continues to exert a direct impact on the senses and feeling. The body
responds, as it has always done, to such basic features of design as
enclosure and exposure, verticality and horizontality, mass, volume,
interior spaciousness, and light.”53

48. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 5–6, 236 (1999); Joel
R. Reidenberg, Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways: Merging Trade and Technical
Paradigms, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 296 (1993) [hereinafter Rules]; see also Joel R.
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology,
76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998) [hereinafter Lex Informatica].
49. See LESSIG, supra note 48.
50. Rules, supra note 48 at 296–99.
51. Quoted in John F. Nivala, The Architecture of a Lawyer’s Operation: Learning from
Frank Lloyd Wright, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 99, 111 (1998).
52. YI-FU TUAN, SPACE AND PLACE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERIENCE 107 (1977).
53. Id. at 116.
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According to Neal Katyal, physical architecture affects human
conduct.54 Architecture can structure spaces to “facilitate unplanned social
interaction” by positioning door entrances so they face each other.55 Certain
architectural designs can be suffocating and constraining, such as cramped
rooms and dark labyrinthine corridors. Other architectural designs can
promote open space and social interaction. According to Thomas Markus,
“[s]paces can be so linked that communication is free and frequent, making
possible dense encounters between classes, groups, and individuals.”56
By influencing human behavior, attitudes, thoughts, and interactions,
architecture plays a profound role in the structuring of society. One of the
ways in which architecture affects society is by enhancing or diminishing
privacy. Architecture shapes public and private spaces. Through the use of
perspectives and glass, through the positioning of rooms, doorways, and
offices, physical architecture can determine what is visible or hidden.
Jeremy Bentham’s design for a prison, which he called the
Panopticon, demonstrates how architecture can shape the very constitution
of society by affecting privacy. Bentham’s design arrays prison cells
around a central observation tower, from which all cells can be monitored.
The prisoners, however, cannot see if there is an observer in the tower.
Therefore, prisoners never know if they are actually being observed, but
they know that at any moment, someone in the tower might be observing
them. This fear of observation results in increased obedience and
discipline in the prison. As Michel Foucault observes, “without any
physical instrument other than architecture and geometry, [the Panopticon]
acts directly on individuals.”57 Unlike dungeons, which served “to enclose,
to deprive of light and to hide,” the Panopticon achieves control through
visibility.58 The Panopticon is a form of architecture that inhibits freedom;
it is an architecture of social control and discipline. For Foucault, the
Panopticon is not merely consigned to physical structures such as prisons.
It is an architecture that is increasingly built into the entire social system:
“The panoptic schema, without disappearing as such or losing any of its
properties, was destined to spread throughout the social body; its vocation
was to become a generalized function.”59 As Foucault contends, we are
currently within “the panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power,
which we bring to ourselves since we are part of its mechanism.”60 In other
words, Foucault argues that the Panopticon is the architectural design for
54. Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002).
55. Id. at 1064.
56. THOMAS A. MARKUS, BUILDINGS AND POWER: FREEDOM AND CONTROL IN THE ORIGIN
OF MODERN BUILDING TYPES 25 (1993).
57. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 206 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1st ed. 1977).
58. Id. at 200.
59. Id. at 207.
60. Id. at 217.
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modern power relations in society. Panoptic architecture is increasingly
replicated in modern society, in both physical and non-physical forms.
Panoptic architecture, and the architecture Lessig and Reidenberg
discuss, are “architectures of control,”61 and they function to exercise
greater dominion over individuals. Lessig observes that “[c]yberspace does
not guarantee its own freedom but instead carries an extraordinary potential
for control.”62 Architecture can function in a variety of other ways. As I
will illustrate later, architecture can create a world where people are
vulnerable to significant harm and are helpless to do anything about it.
Therefore, in addition to architectures of control, we are seeing the
development of what I call “architectures of vulnerability.”
If we view certain privacy problems as architectural, we begin to see
how the design and structure of information flows affect movement,
communication, association, and other fundamental practices in a free and
democratic society. Privacy is thus an issue about the type of society we
are building. Information flows are critical in shaping society in the
Information Age. Our environment is not only shaped spatially by the
architecture of buildings and the layout of cities, but by the design of
information systems. This architecture has similar effects as spatial design
on our behavior, attitudes, norms, social interaction, sense of freedom, and
security.
The traditional model often views privacy problems as separate from
legal structures, as social problems that are remedied by the law. We often
see privacy as naturally occurring and threatened by rapidly developing
technology. Law must intervene to protect privacy. However, law creates
and constructs the world we live in. This is particularly true with privacy.
To a significant degree, privacy is legally constructed. Law already shapes
our ability to hide information and it influences information accessibility.
Law makes certain information publicly available; it keeps places (such as
the home) private by enforcing trespass and property laws. Law also
shapes our expectations of privacy in many contexts.63
The law also influences much of the loss of privacy. Many privacy
problems are the product of legal decisions that have been made over the
past century as we have shaped our modern information economy. Once
we understand the full extent of the legal construction of privacy, we will
realize that privacy is not passively slipping away but is being actively
eliminated by the way we are constructing the information economy
through the law.

61. LESSIG, supra note 48, at 30.
62. Id. at 58.
63. See Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 843, 846–68 (2002) (discussing how courts, legislatures, and other government
entities shape expectations of privacy); Solove, supra note 22, at 1142–43 (discussing how the
law shaped expectations of privacy in postal letters).
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For problems that are architectural, the solutions should also be
architectural. Privacy must be protected by a particular architecture, one
that regulates power in our social relationships. An architecture of privacy
protection is a way to structure power in social relationships between
people, institutions, and the government. Unless people’s relationships with
bureaucracies are placed on more equal footing, affording people default
property rights in information or other forms of information control will not
adequately protect privacy. Protecting privacy thus depends upon
regulating relationships, often by enforcing limits on the power of
bureaucratic organizations.
Architecture protects privacy differently than individual remedies. It
is more proactive than reactive; it involves creating structures to prevent
harms from arising rather than merely providing remedies when harms
occur. The traditional model enforces privacy through legal remedies
employed at the initiative of individuals and penalties to specific
wrongdoers. Architectural remedies are more systemic in nature, and they
work by altering social structure to make it harder for torts and crimes to
occur. As Neal Katyal persuasively argues, architecture deals with crime
differently than criminal penalties; it can prevent crime, facilitate the
capture of criminals, and can even “shape individuals’ attitudes toward
lawbreaking.”64 Tort and criminal law often focus on individuals in ways
that fail to lead to changes in architecture.
I am not contending that affording individuals a cause of action or a
remedy for privacy invasions is inappropriate or completely ineffective.
Indeed, individual remedies must be a component of any architecture.
However, individual remedies alone are often not sufficient, for their
viability and effectiveness depends upon the architecture in which they are
embedded.
I am also not arguing that the traditional model is incorrect and should
be abandoned. The traditional model was designed for the privacy
problems experienced during the times that Warren and Brandeis wrote
their article. Although it still works for a number of privacy problems
today, it does not work for all privacy problems. In fact, understanding
privacy problems with the notion of architecture is not in conflict with the
view of privacy articulated by Warren and Brandeis. A critical part of
Warren and Brandeis’s argument was the importance of the law’s ability to
respond to new problems. Today, we face a host of different privacy
problems. We need to recognize their differences and adapt the law to
grapple with them rather than continue to view them through old lenses and
attempt to resolve them in the same manner as other problems.
Warren and Brandeis wrote long before the rise of massive record
systems and information networks. The problems created by the growing
accumulation, dissemination, and networking of personal information are
64. Katyal, supra note 54, at 1073–74.
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better understood architecturally than under the traditional model. Viewing
these problems through architecture reveals that the problems are caused in
a different manner than we might have originally supposed. It recognizes
harm within design and structure. And it alters the strategies by which we
seek to adapt law to solve the problems.
Thus far, what I have said has been relatively abstract. In the
remainder of this article, I will provide a specific demonstration of these
points through the example of one of the most rapidly growing and
troubling problems of the information economy—the problem of identity
theft.

III. Reconceptualizing Identity Theft
A.

The Identity Theft Problem

A person loses his wallet while on vacation in Florida. His wallet
contains his driver’s license and other personal information. An identity
thief uses the victim’s information for more than twelve years to buy and
sell property, open bank accounts, establish phone service, and so on.65
Pursuant to a Florida warrant based on the criminal conduct of the identity
thief, the victim is arrested in California and imprisoned for over a week.
The victim also has civil judgments issued against him.66
The identity of a retired 74-year old man is stolen. Debts continue to
amass on his credit reports. Although the victim lives in Maryland, a Texas
bank issues a car loan to the identity thief in Texas.67 The victim
continually fights to have the debts removed from his credit reports, but he
is told to take up the issues with the creditors who claim that the debts are
legitimate. Even after debts are removed, they reappear on his credit
reports because a different collection agency replaces them.68
These are examples of what has come to be called “identity theft.”
Identity theft is a problem involving personal information. As defined by
the United States General Accounting Office, “identity theft or identity
fraud generally involves ‘stealing’ another person’s personal identifying
information . . . and then using that information to fraudulently establish
credit, run up debt, or take over existing financial accounts.”69 Identity
theft is not the same as ordinary credit card fraud, where a thief steals and
65. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IDENTITY THEFT: GREATER AWARENESS AND
USE OF EXISTING DATA ARE NEEDED, H.R. REP. NO. GAO-02-766, at 23 (2002) [hereinafter
U.S. GAO].
66. Id.
67. See Albert B. Crenshaw, Victims of Identity Theft Battle Creditors as Well as Crooks,
WASH. POST, July 21, 2002, at H4.
68. Id.
69. U.S. GAO, supra note 65, at 1; see also Jennifer 8. Lee, Fighting Back When Someone
Steals Your Name, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at C8. For more background, see generally BETH
GIVENS, THE PRIVACY RIGHTS HANDBOOK 227–48 (1997).
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uses a person’s credit card. In identity theft, the culprit obtains personal
information and uses it in a variety of fraudulent ways to impersonate the
victim. The thief obtains personal information from database companies
and public records, or by stealing wallets, pilfering mail, or rooting through
trash to find data on discarded documents.70
According to the FBI, identity theft is the most rapidly growing type
of white-collar criminal activity.71 According to estimates by the Federal
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, there are half a million victims
of identity theft each year.72 In 2001, the most common complaint of
consumer fraud was identity theft,73 constituting 42% of consumer
complaints to the FTC in 2001.74 Based on estimates, identity theft results
in $5 billion in losses to financial institutions and other companies.75
Identity theft can be a harrowing experience, and it can be devastating
to victims. According to estimates, a victim must spend over two years and
close to 200 hours to repair the damage that identity theft causes.76 Further,
victims often have to spend thousands of dollars to remedy the harm.77
Victims experience great anxiety, leading to psychological harm in certain
cases.78 Victims have difficulty “obtaining loans, mortgages, security
clearances, promotions and even gaining employment.”79 And as noted
above, victims are even arrested based on warrants for the crimes of the
identity thieves.80
70. See Beth Givens, Identity Theft: How It Happens, Its Impact on Victims, and Legislative
Solutions, Testimony for U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on Technology, Terrorism, and
Government Information 3–4 (July 12, 2000), at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/id_theft.htm;
see also JOHN R. VACCA, IDENTITY THEFT 8–9 (2003).
71. See Lee, supra note 69, at 8.
72. See O’Harrow, Jr., supra note 1, at A1.
73. Reuters, Identity Theft Tops Consumer Fraud Complaints, (Jan. 23, 2002), at
http://www.techtv.com/news/print/0,231102,3369333,00.html.
74. See Yochi J. Dreazen, U.S. Is Cracking Down on Thefts of Identity, Arresting About 130,
WALL ST. J., May 3, 2002, at B4.
75. Id.
76. See Janine Benner, Beth Givens & Ed Mierzwinski, Nowhere to Turn: Victims Speak Out
(May
2000),
at
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/idtheft
on
Identity
Theft,
2000.htm [hereinafter Nowhere to Turn]; see also Lee, supra note 69, at 8; Brandon McKelvey,
Financial Institutions’ Duty of Confidentiality to Keep Customner’s Personal Information Secure
from the Threat of Identity Theft, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1077, 1086–87 (2001).
77. Christopher P. Couch, Commentary, Forcing the Choice Between Commerce and
Consumers: Application of the FCRA to Identity Theft, 53 ALA. L. REV. 583, 586 (2002).
78. Id.
79. Martha A. Sabol, The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998: Do
Individual Victims Finally Get Their Day in Court?, 11 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 165, 167
(1999); see also Maria Ramirez-Palafox, Identity Theft on the Rise: Will the Real John Doe
Please Step Forward?, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 483, 484 (1998); McKelvey, supra note 76, at
1087.
80. Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 89, 91 (2001); see also Privacy Rights Clearinghouse and Identity Theft Resource Center,
Criminal
Identity
Theft
89,
91
(May
2002),
at
http://www.privacyrights.
org/fs/fs11g-CrimIdTheft.htm.
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Identity theft creates these problems because we are becoming a
society increasingly dependent upon personal information. Our personal
information dossiers are critical to our ability to function in modern life.
We increasingly rely on various records and documents to assess
reputation.81 According to Steven Nock, this form of reputation, based on
“credentials,” enables reputations to become “portable.”82 Portability of
reputation is important in modern society because people are highly mobile
and creditors often lack first-hand experience of the financial condition and
trustworthiness of individuals.83 Today, creditors rely upon credit reporting
agencies to obtain information about a person’s credit history. The reports
reveal a person’s consistency in paying back debts as well as the person’s
loan defaulting risk. Credit reports contain a detailed financial history,
financial account information, outstanding debts, bankruptcy filings,
judgments, liens, and mortgage foreclosures. Today, there are three major
credit reporting agencies—Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union. Each
agency has compiled extensive dossiers about almost every adult United
States citizen.84 Credit reports have become essential to securing a loan,
obtaining a job, purchasing a home or a car, applying for a license, or even
renting an apartment.85
Personal information is also used to establish accounts with
merchants, ISPs, cable companies, phone companies, and so on. Personal
information can be employed to access various accounts and record
systems with financial institutions, health organizations, schools,
government agencies, and other entities.
The identity thief not only pilfers victims’ personal information, but
also pollutes their dossiers by adding false information, such as unpaid
debts, traffic violations, parking tickets, and arrests. The harm of identity
theft is not solely financial; it can permeate into a person’s everyday life.
The victim cannot readily recover the personal information the way stolen
property can be recovered. The victim must constantly defend against the
identity thief’s next move. Even after the victim cleans up her credit
reports, if the identity thief remains at large, there may be further pollution.
This is another way in which identity theft differs from credit card fraud or
the theft of an ATM card or access card. Once the card is cancelled, the
crime ends. With identity theft, the crime can continue, for personal
information works like an “access card” that cannot be readily deactivated.
81. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 314 (2000).
82. STEVEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY: SURVEILLANCE AND REPUTATION IN
AMERICA 3 (1993).
83. See id. at 3, 73.
84. For example, Experian has information on 205 million Americans. See, e.g., EXPERIAN,
EXPERIAN
FACT
SHEET,
(2003),
at
http://www.experian.com/corporate/
factsheet.html.
85. See, e.g., VACCA, supra note 70, at 30.
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Additionally, the problem of identity theft is a social problem, not
only a harm to particular people. Identity theft weakens the security of us
all. There have been several reports of terrorists engaging in identity theft
to facilitate their activities.86 In one case, identity thieves used victims’
identities to create a fake green card, Canadian passport, and Canadian
citizenship card.87 Further, beyond losses to particular individuals, identity
theft results in losses to creditors, financial institutions, and companies, and
these losses are passed down to consumers in the form of higher interest
rates, prices, and fees.
B.

Identity Theft and the Traditional Model

Thus far, identity theft has been viewed under the traditional model—
as a harm to individuals by criminals. Identity theft unquestionably harms
individuals and certainly involves criminals. Therefore, it is no surprise
that identity theft is viewed under the traditional model and that the
solutions to identity theft emerge from that model.
In 1998, Congress passed the Identity Theft and Identity Theft and
Assumption Deterrence Act. The Act makes it a federal crime to
“knowingly transfer or use, without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet,
any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that
constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law.”88 Prior to the
1998 Act, various aspects of identity theft were criminalized by a variety of
other statutes at the federal level. The Act provides a more uniform and
comprehensive penal regime for identity theft,89 and it expands the means
of identification constituting identity theft to include SSNs, birth dates,
biometric identifiers, and other information.90
Since 1998, the vast majority of states have passed laws to criminalize
identity theft.91 Prior to 1998, only three states had enacted identity theft
statutes.92 As of 2002, 44 states criminalize identity theft.93 Thus, it is only
recently that policymakers have turned their attention to identity theft, and
the overwhelming approach in dealing with it has been to enact criminal
penalties. For example, Florida punishes identity theft as a felony, with the
severity dependent upon the amount of money the thief takes,94 and the
86. See Shelley Murphy & Douglas Belkin, Terror Link Seen in Identity Thefts, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2002, at A1.
87. Id.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (West 1998).
89. U.S. GAO, supra note 65, at 5.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1.
92. Id. at 7.
93. Id. at 6.
94. Fraudulent use of personal identification information is third degree felony. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 817.568(2)(a) (2000). The offense is a second degree felony if the injury is $75,000 or
more. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568(2)(b) (2000). The offense is first degree misdemeanor if the
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identity thief may be required to pay restitution to the victim.95 Likewise,
New Jersey punishes identity theft based on the pecuniary amount of the
injury.96 The New Jersey statute does not provide for victims’ rights and
remedies. Pennsylvania has a similar scheme.97 Arizona, one of the first
states to enact an identity theft law, penalizes all identity thefts as a lowgrade felony,98 but does not address victims’ rights and remedies. Unlike
many other states, California, in addition to criminalizing identity theft
with a maximum one year imprisonment,99 provides assistance for victims
to repair the damage. The victim can obtain the fraudulent applications
made by the identity thief and a record of the transactions and charges.100
Despite some variations, these approaches view identity theft as a species
of crime, akin to other forms of criminal behavior, and the law focuses on
protecting people from the actions of these criminals.
There are several problems with viewing identity theft exclusively in
this manner. First, law enforcement agencies have thus far not devoted
adequate resources toward investigating and prosecuting identity theft
cases. In a GAO survey of 10 states, officials admitted that they had
“insufficient” resources to respond to identity theft.101 Resources are
lacking because other crimes, such as violent crimes and drug offenses,
consume significant resources.102 Additionally, “[i]dentity theft cases
require highly trained investigators, require longer-than-usual efforts, and
often end without an arrest.”103 Prison sentences for identity theft are

personal information is used to harass the individual. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568(3) (2000). If
the offense was facilitated or furthered by using a public record (see § 119.011) the offense is
reclassified to the next higher degree. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568(4) (2000).
95. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568(6)(a) (2000).
96. If the value received or injury is $75,000 or more the violation is a second degree crime.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 21-17(c)(1) (West 2002). If the injury or value received is $500 or more
but less than $75,000 the violation is a third degree crime. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 21-17(c)(1)
(West 2002). If the injury is $200 or more but less than $500 then the violation is fourth degree
crime. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 21-17(c)(1) (West 2002). If the injury is less than $200, or the
person was unsuccessful in obtaining a benefit, then the violation is a disorderly persons offense.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 21-17(c)(2) (West 2002).
97. Values involving less than $2000 are first degree misdemeanors. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 4120(c)(1)(i) (West 2002). Values involving 2000 or more are third degree felonies. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4120(c)(1)(ii) (West 2002). The offense is a third degree felony if committed in
furtherance of a criminal conspiracy regardless of the value involved. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
4120(c)(1)(iii) (West 2002). The offense is a second degree felony regardless of the value if the
offense is the third or subsequent offense. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4120(c)(1)(iv) (West 2002).
The grading shall be one grade higher if the victim is 60 years of age or older. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4120(c)(2) (West 2002).
98. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008(D)(West 2002).
99. CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.5(a) (West 2002).
100. CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.8(a) (West 2002).
101. U.S. GAO, supra note 65, at 17.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 18.

7/18/2003 12:18 PM

April 2003]

IDENTITY THEFT

21

relatively short.104 Identity theft often occurs across different jurisdictions,
and law enforcement officials “sometimes tend to view identity theft as
being ‘someone else’s problem.’”105 As a result, most identity theft crimes
remain unsolved.106
Second, the retrospective view of the law, which allows individuals to
fix the damage caused by identity theft, is complicated by the profound
lack of power individuals have over controlling their personal information.
Victims experience great difficulty in obtaining redress for identity theft.
Victims are often unaware that their identities have been stolen until
long after the identity theft has begun. A report based on victim surveys
estimates that it takes victims over a year to discover that they have been
victimized.107 According to FTC estimates, 20% of identity theft victims
learn of the theft after two years.108 One tip-off that a person is a victim of
identity theft is an unusual item on one’s credit report. The identity thief
often takes out loans and uses lines of credit which the thief never pays
back. These delinquencies show up on the victim’s credit report, and
destroy the victim’s credit rating. Unfortunately, the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA),109 which regulates credit reporting agencies, fails to provide
people with adequate resources to discover that they are being victimized
or repair the damage done by identity theft. Although the FCRA permits
individuals to contest the accuracy of information in their credit histories110
and enables individuals to sue to collect damages for violations of the
Act,111 these rights often are ineffectual. One problem is that people often
do not know what information is contained in their credit reports. To
obtain such information, people must pay a fee of $8.50 to each of the three
major credit reporting agencies—Experian, Equifax, and Trans Union—to
obtain a copy of their credit report. And individuals must do this with
regularity to ensure that their credit reports remain accurate.
Credit reporting agencies have a duty to investigate consumer disputes
with the accuracy of their reports, but this often is ineffective in cases of
identity theft.112 In one of the most important scholarly articles written
about identity theft, Lynn LoPucki observes that the “victim is asked to
prove a negative: namely, that he or she is not the person who borrowed
from the creditor. The victim’s evidence is likely to be complex and
Creditors do not have sufficient incentives to
circumstantial.”113
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Lee, supra note 69, at C8.
107. Nowhere to Turn, supra note 76, at 3.
108. Jane Black, Who’s Policing the Credit Cops?, BUS. WEEK ONLINE (Aug. 29, 2002), at
http://www.businessweek.com/print/technology/content/aug2002/tc20020829_8532.htm.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (West 1998).
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (West 1998).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (West 1998).
112. LoPucki, supra note 80, at 92.
113. Id. at 107.
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investigate, for if the victim is correct, creditors cannot recover on the
debt.114 LoPucki also aptly argues that the “victim lacks a forum in which
to proceed. The victim has no right to a hearing on the accuracy of the
information requested.”115 Moreover, the “FTC seldom acts on the
complaint of a single customer.”116
The FCRA does not allow people to sue for “defamation, invasion of
privacy, or negligence” when the credit reporting agency discloses false
information or a creditor reports false information to a credit reporting
agency unless the information is “furnished with malice or willful intent to
injure such consumer.”117 Rather, the FCRA provides a cause of action for
negligently failing to comply with its provisions.118 However, a victim
must bring an action within two years “from the date on which the liability
arises.”119 In TRW, Inc. v. Andrews,120 the Supreme Court held that twoyear statute of limitations period does not begin to run when the plaintiff
discovers that the FCRA has been violated. Rather, the statute of
limitations begins when the violations occurred, even if the plaintiff
remains unaware of the violations.
At present, the law does not allow individuals enough involvement in
the uses and dissemination of their personal information to quickly
discover that they are victims of identity theft or to obtain redress after
identity theft occurs.
Viewing identity theft under the traditional model—as a series of
isolated thefts from particular individuals—results in commentators often
urging individuals to take a variety of steps to avoid being victimized.
Thus, many discussions about solving identity theft include
recommendations for how individuals can protect themselves against
identity theft. As one commentator concludes: “[W]ith hard work,
cooperation, and effective communication between law enforcement and
the public, identity thieves will be held accountable.”121 Professor Fred
Cate takes an even stronger position, contending that the problem of
identity theft can be prevented significantly if people exercised more care
over their data:
Despite all the bills introduced to combat the theft of identity,
individual action may provide the best defense: keeping a close watch
on account activity; reporting suspicious or unfamiliar transactions
promptly; properly destroying commercial solicitations; storing

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (West 1998).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (West 1998).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (West 1998).
120. 534 U.S. 19, 26 (2001).
121. Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millennium, 80 OR. L. REV. 1423,
1447 (2001).
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valuable documents securely; protecting account names and passwords;
and never disclosing personal information to unknown callers.122

A report by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation reprinted by
the FTC suggests several tips for people to “minimize” the risk of identity
theft:123
Pay attention to your billing cycles. . . .
Guard your mail from theft . . . .
Do not give out personal information . . . .
Keep items with personal information in a safe place. . . .
Give your SSN only when absolutely necessary. . . .
Don’t carry your SSN card; leave it in a secure place. . . .
Order a copy of your credit report from each of the three major credit
reporting agencies every year. . . .124

The general advice is that if people take a number of steps, identity
theft will be minimized. However, personal data is often collected
unwittingly, without consent; SSNs are frequently used and refusal to give
out one’s SSN results in considerable inconvenience; and many people
cannot even name the three major credit reporting agencies, let alone
request a copy of their credit reports, for which they are charged a fee.
Even if people did take all these steps, the risks of identity theft are still not
significantly minimized. According to an official at the FTC, “[t]here is no
way you can fully immunize yourself from identity theft because the
information is out there.”125
I contend that the prevailing approach toward dealing with identity
theft—by relying on increasing criminal penalties and by depending upon
individuals to take great lengths to try to protect themselves against their
vulnerabilities to identity theft—has the wrong focus. Of course, identity
thieves should be prosecuted; and people should avoid being careless with
their data. The law has significant room to improve in the prosecution of
identity theft. But these solutions fail to address the foundations of the
problem. The underlying cause of identity theft is an architecture that
makes us vulnerable to such crimes and unable to adequately repair the
damage.
C.

Identity Theft as Architecture

Identity theft is a consequence of an architecture, one that creates a
series of vulnerabilities. This architecture is not created by identity thieves;
rather, it is exploited by them. It is an architecture of vulnerability, one
122. FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN PERSPECTIVE 22 (2001).
123. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION & ID THEFT: WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO YOUR
GOOD NAME 3 (2002) [hereinafter FTC, BAD THINGS].
124. Id. at 5–7.
125. Lee, supra note 69, at C8.
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where personal information is not protected with adequate security, where
identity thieves have easy access to data and the ability to use it in
detrimental ways. We are increasingly living with what I call “digital
dossiers” about our lives, and these dossiers are not controlled by us but by
various entities, such as private-sector companies and the government.
These dossiers play a profound role in our lives in modern society. The
identity thief taps into these dossiers and uses them, manipulates them, and
pollutes them. The identity thief’s ability to so easily access and use our
personal data stems from an architecture that does not provide adequate
security to our personal information and that does not afford us with a
sufficient degree of participation in the collection, dissemination, and use
of that information. Consequently, it is difficult for the victim to figure out
what is going on and how she can remedy the situation.
The traditional view fails to address this architecture, for it focuses on
identity theft as a series of discrete instances of crime rather than as a larger
problem about the way our personal information is handled. Even the term
of “identity theft” views it as an instance of crime—a “theft” rather than as
the product of inadequate security.
The architecture enabling identity theft emerges from the government
and the private sector. With regard to the government part of the structure,
the Social Security number (SSN) and public record systems create a
regime where identity is readily stolen and the consequences are severe.
SSNs are a key piece of information for identity theft. SSNs can
unlock a wealth of other information held by the government and the
private sector.126 The identity thief, as Lynn LoPucki observes, “ordinarily
needs personal information about the victim, such as the victim’s name,
social security number, birth date, or mother’s maiden name.”127 Thus,
information enables the identity thief to apply for credit or open accounts in
the victim’s name.128
One of the primary means by which a national identification system is
developing in the United States is the SSN. The SSN is currently used for
identification in a number of contexts. SSNs were created in 1936 as part
of the Social Security System and were not designed to be used for a
general identifier. Indeed, for many years, the social security card stated
that it was “NOT FOR IDENTIFICATION.”129 However, over time,
numerous federal agencies began using the SSN for identification, as well
as state and local governments, schools, banks, hospitals, and other private
sector entities.130
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

U.S. GAO, supra note 65, at 7.
LoPucki, supra note 80, at 94.
Id. at 104.
SMITH, supra note 81, at 288.
See, e.g., CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 52 (1999); UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY,
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: SOCIAL SECURITY: GOVERNMENT
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In the early 1970s, the growing uses of the SSN raised serious
concerns that the SSN would become a de facto universal identifier. In
1973, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued a major
report on privacy, stating:
We take the position that a standard universal identifier (SUI) should not
be established in the United States now or in the foreseeable future. By
our definition, the Social Security Number (SSN) cannot fully qualify as
an SUI; it only approximates one. However, there is an increasing
tendency for the Social Security number to be used as if it were an
SUI.131

In the Privacy Act of 1974, Congress partially responded to these
concerns by prohibiting government agencies from denying any right,
benefit, or privilege merely because an individual refused to disclose his or
her SSN. The Privacy Act was passed to “curtail the expanding use of
social security numbers by federal and local agencies and, by so doing, to
eliminate the threat to individual privacy and confidentiality of information
posed by common numerical identifiers.”132 However, the Privacy Act did
not restrict the use of SSNs by the private sector.
The use of the SSN continued to escalate after the Privacy Act.133
SSNs are collected by private-sector database firms from a number of
public and non-public sources, such as court records or credit reports. It is
currently legal for private firms to sell or disclose SSNs. As one
commentator has observed, “governmental dissemination of personal
identifying numbers is still widespread, and limits on private actors are also
virtually nonexistent.”134
The SSN functions in the United States as a de facto identifier, and
there is scant protection on its use. SSNs are often widely available.
Schools frequently use student SSNs as student identifiers. This exposes
student SSNs to a large number of university personnel. States often place
SSNs on driver’s licenses. This exposes SSNs to anybody who checks a
driver’s license for identification. Additionally, SSNs are requested on a
wide variety of applications.
SSNs are used as passwords to obtain access to a host of personal
records from banks, investment companies, schools, hospitals, doctors, and

AND COMMERCIAL USE OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS WIDESPREAD (1999); SIMSON
GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 33–34 (2000).
131. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS: RECORDS, COMPUTERS,
AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS xxxii (1973) [hereinafter HEW 1973 REPORT].

132. Doyle v. Wilson, 529 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (D. Del. 1982).
133. See U.S. GAO, supra note 65.
134. Flavio L. Komuves, We’ve Got Your Number: An Overview of Legislation and Decisions
to Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as Personal Identifiers, 16 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529, 569 (1998).
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so on.135 The SSN is a powerful number, for with it a person can open and
close accounts, change addresses, obtain loans, access personal
information, make financial transactions, and more. Indeed, several courts
have noted the myriad ways SSNs can be misused to gain access to an
individual’s personal information or accounts. In Greidinger v. Davis,136
the court struck down a voter registration system requiring voters to
provide SSNs (which were then made publicly available). This system
infringed upon the right to vote because it forced people to risk public
disclosure of their SSNs in order to vote, exposing them to undue risks.137
In Beacon Journal v. City of Akron,138 a court held that a state freedom of
information act did not extend to public employees’ SSNs:
Thanks to the abundance of databases in the private sector that include
the SSNs of persons listed in their files, an intruder using an SSN can
quietly discover the intimate details of a victim’s personal life without
the victim ever knowing of the intrusion.139

According to the Court, the disclosure of SSNs would create a “high
potential for fraud and victimization.”140 Likewise, in City of Kirkland v.
Sheehan,141 a court restricted the disclosure of law enforcement personnel’s
SSNs because:
Access to an individual’s SSN enables a new holder to obtain access to
and to control, manipulate or alter other personal information. In effect,
access to an SSN allows a person, agency or company to more efficiently
and effectively search for and seize information and assets of another.142

In short, the SSN functions as a magic key that can unlock vast stores
of records as well as financial accounts. The SSN is the identity thief’s
best tool.
Viewed in terms of architecture, the government has created an
identification number without affording adequate precautions against its
misuse. In so doing, the government has exposed every citizen to
significant vulnerability to identity theft and other crimes such as fraud and
stalking. Seen in this light, the problem is very much the product of the
law. Identity thieves are certainly to blame, but we must also recognize the
profound role that the government has played in creating the problem.
Not only are the uses of SSNs inadequately controlled, but SSNs are
relatively easy for the identity thief to obtain. SSNs and other personal
135. For example, an identity thief purchased the SSNs of several top corporate executives
from Internet database companies. The thief then used the SSNs to obtain more personal
information about the victims. Benjamin Weiser, Identity Theft, and These Were Big Identities,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2002, at B3.
136. 988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1993).
137. Id. at 1354.
138. 640 N.E.2d 164 (Ohio, 1994).
139. Id. at 169.
140. Id.
141. No. 01-2-09513-7 SEA, 2001 WL 1751590 (Wash. Super. May 10, 2001).
142. Id. at 2372.
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information that assists identity thieves can be obtained via public records
or from database companies that market personal data culled from public
records. Identity thieves can obtain the data to carry out their crime from
various personal information record systems.143 Public record systems can
reveal a panoply of personal information, which can be aggregated and
combined with other data to construct what amounts to a “digital
biography” about a person.144 There are over 165 companies that gather
information from public records across the country and peddle that data
over the Internet.145 Public records can contain SSNs, birth dates, mother’s
maiden names, addresses of home and work, property descriptions and
value, phone numbers, photographs, height, weight, eye color, gender,
email addresses, and salary information.146 Court records can contain even
more sensitive information about medical conditions, employment, and
finances.147 SSNs are in fact required by law to be publicly disclosed in
bankruptcy records.148
Identity thieves thus can plunder public records, which are
increasingly being made readily accessible on the Internet, for personal
information to carry out their crimes. For example, recently the clerk of
courts for Hamilton County, Ohio placed the county’s public records on the
Internet. From a speeding ticket placed on the website, an identity thief
accessed a victim’s SSN, address, birth date, signature, and other personal
information and opened up credit card accounts in the victim’s name.149
Further, identity thieves can obtain SSNs and other personal information
simply by paying a small fee to various database companies and obtaining
a detailed dossier about their victims.150 Some identity thieves employ
information brokers and private investigators to obtain personal
information, and the practices of certain information brokers and private
investigators are often unsavory. One practice is hiring pretext callers, who
call financial companies and impersonate a customer in order to obtain
personal information.151
The problem, however, runs deeper than the public disclosure of SSNs
and personal information. The problem stems not only from the
143. See O’Harrow, Jr., supra note 1 at A1.
144. See Access, supra note 25, at 1184–95.
145. Id. at 1152–53.
146. Id. at 1142–49.
147. Id. at 1145–48.
148. See 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (Any “paper filed . . . and the dockets of a bankruptcy court are
public records and open to examination by an entity at reasonable times without charge.”); see
also Mary Jo Obee & William C. Plouffe, Jr., Privacy in the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 14
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1011, 1020 (2000).
149. Jennifer 8. Lee, Dirty Laundry Online For All to See: By Posting Court Records,
Cincinnati Opens a Pandora’s Box of Privacy Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2002, at G1.
150. See O’Harrow, Jr., supra note 1, at A1.
151. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Three Charged With Selling Confidential Data in FTC Sting,
WASH. POST., Apr. 19, 2001, at E3.
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government’s creation of a de facto identifier and lax protection of it, but
also from the private sector’s inadequate security measures in handling
personal information. Private sector entities lack adequate ways of
controlling access to records and accounts in a person’s name, and
numerous companies engage in the common practice of using SSNs,
mother’s maiden names, and addresses for access to account information.152
Additionally, creditors give out credit and establish new accounts if the
applicant supplies a name, SSN, and address.
The credit reporting system also employs inadequate precautions to
ensure against inaccuracies in credit reports and improper access to the
system. As discussed earlier, our financial reputations are currently
assessed by credit reporting agencies. These companies report information
about our financial condition and credit worthiness to creditors and others.
People are assigned a credit score, which impacts whether they will be
extended credit, and, if so, what rate of interest will be charged. Credit
reporting agencies do not work for the individuals they report on; rather,
they are paid by creditors. As a result, they do not establish a relationship
with those they report on. Even though the FCRA gives people certain
rights with regard to the information reported about them by credit
reporting agencies, there is still a significant lack of accountability because
credit reporting agencies have no incentive to compete for the business of
those they report on. According to Lynn LoPucki, the problem emerges
because “creditors and credit-reporting agencies often lack both the means
and the incentives to correctly identify the persons who seek credit from
them or on whom they report.”153 LoPucki aptly shifts the focus away from
the thieves and victims to the entities controlling personal data. He
correctly contends that identity theft stems from the private sector’s use of
SSNs for identification.154
Viewed in terms of architecture, we begin to see that identity theft is
part of a larger cluster of problems, caused by bureaucratization. By this, I
am referring to problems emerging from the existence of information
networks maintained by large bureaucratic organizations. Bureaucratic
organization, Max Weber asserts, consists of a hierarchical chain-ofcommand, specialized offices to carry out particular functions, and a
system of general rules to manage the organization.155 Bureaucracy is not
limited to public sector organizations; it is a feature of business
management as well government administration.156

152. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Concerns for ID Theft Often Are Unheeded, WASH. POST, July 23,
2001, at A1; Ramirez-Palafox, supra note 79 at 486.
153. Lopucki, supra note 80, at 94.
154. Id. at 108–14
155. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 957–58 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.
1978).
156. Id. at 974.
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Bureaucracy is deeply ensconced in the modern world, which requires
the efficient flow of information in order to communicate, to deliver goods
and services, to regulate, to oversee industries, and to administer basic
government functions. As Weber observes, bureaucracy is “capable of
attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the
most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings.”157
According to Weber, bureaucracy is a superior form of organization:
[P]recision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity,
discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of
material and personal costs—these are raised to the optimum point in the
strictly bureaucratic administration.158

Although bureaucratic organization is an essential feature of modern
society and has numerous benefits, bureaucracy can also present numerous
problems. As Paul Schwartz notes, bureaucracy depends upon “vast
quantities of information” that “relate[] to identifiable individuals.”159
Much of this information is important and necessary to the smooth
functioning of bureaucracies; but collection and use of personal data pose
new dangers to privacy. As the Supreme Court noted in Whalen v. Roe:160
The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security
benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed
Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require the orderly
preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is
personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if
disclosed.161

There are several general tendencies of modern bureaucracies that
expose people to great vulnerability. Paul Schwartz contends that because
bureaucracy does not adequately protect the dignity of the people it deals
with, it can “weaken an individual’s capacity for critical reflection and
participation in society.”162 Additionally, decisions within public and
private bureaucratic organizations are often hidden from public view,
decreasing accountability. As Weber notes, “[b]ureaucratic administration
always tends to exclude the public, to hide its knowledge and action from
criticism as well as it can.”163 Bureaucratic organizations often have
hidden pockets of discretion. At lower levels, discretion can enable abuses.
Frequently, bureaucracies can fail to train employees adequately and
employ sub-par security measures over personal data. Bureaucracies are
often careless in their uses and handling of personal information.164
157. Id. at 223.
158. Id. at 973.
159. Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the
American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1332 (1992).
160. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
161. Id. at 605.
162. Schwartz, supra note 159, at 1365.
163. WEBER, supra note 155, at 992.
164. Solove, Privacy, supra note 25, at 1428–29.
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These bureaucratic processes exist in a world where information about
people is collected, combined, and traded without their knowledge or
consent. People have minimal participation in the process. They lack
knowledge about what information is collected, how it is used, to whom it
is disclosed, and how carefully it is protected. Privacy policies often
promise that data will be kept secure, but they fail to specify how or
provide enough detail for people to assess meaningfully the level of
security.
Therefore, the problem runs deeper than identity theft. It is the fact
that we have so little participation in our personal data combined with the
fact that it flows so insecurely and carelessly without sufficient control.
The harm is not simply measured in the overt instances of identity theft and
abuse, but in the fact that we are made more vulnerable to a series of errors,
abuses, and dangers.
With ever more frequency, we are hearing stories about security
glitches and other instances of personal data being leaked and abused. For
example, in one instance, explicit details of ninety psychotherapy patients’
sex lives, as well as their names, addresses, telephone numbers, and credit
card numbers were mistakenly posted on the Internet.165 In 2002, identity
thieves improperly used Ford Motor Credit Company’s code to access the
credit files of 13,000 of Ford’s customers, which were maintained by
Experian, a major credit reporting agency.166 Choicepoint, a database
company that gathers information about individuals and sells it to
government agencies and various private sector companies, inadvertently
exposed some of its databases on the Internet.167 Citibank employed a
database marketing company to collect the email addresses of its credit
card customers and send them emails offering them access to their financial
information.168 This was done without verifying whether the email
addresses actually belonged to the particular customers.169
The problems of information handling are most vividly illustrated by a
recent incident involving officials at Princeton University who improperly
accessed personal information maintained in a Yale University database. In
December 2001, Yale University established a website enabling
undergraduate applicants to find out whether they had been accepted or
denied admission.170 The website also enabled students to enter additional
165. Barb Albert, Patients’ Medical Records Inadvertently Posted on Net, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Mar. 30, 1999, at A1.
166. Bruce Mohl, Large-Scale Identity Theft is Painful Reminder of Risk, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 12, 2002, at C3.
167. Brian McWilliams, Data Firm Exposes Records Online, WIRED NEWS, (Jan. 22, 2002),
at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,49893,00.html.
168. See Yochi J. Dreazen, Citibank’s E-Mail Data Offer Raises Online-Privacy Concerns,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2002, at D2.
169. See id.
170. Elise Jordan & Arielle Levin Becker, Princeton Officials Broke Into Yale Online
Admissions Decisions, YALE DAILY NEWS, July. 25, 2002, at http://www.
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information, such as their interests and hobbies.171 To gain access to the
website, the students were asked their name, birth date, and SSN.172 SSNs
were chosen as a password because of their “personally identifiable
nature.”173 A Princeton University admissions official accessed Yale’s
website and certain applicants’ accounts on April 3, 2002.174 This was
made possible by the fact that these applicants had also applied to
Princeton, and the Princeton admissions officials had the applicants’ SSNs.
After the official informed other admissions staff of the ability to log onto
Yale’s website, the admissions staff accessed additional student files from
admissions’ office computers for a total of twelve unauthorized visits to
Yale’s Web site.175 Princeton officials checked certain student files more
than once.176 The Princeton official stated that he was motivated by
curiosity and a desire to test the security of a Web based system because
Princeton was looking into providing a similar system for admissions.177
After discovering the unauthorized access by Princeton, Yale reported the
incident to the FBI.178
The focus of the law in this security breach was on the actions of the
Princeton officials. Yet the problem was created by Yale’s inept security
measures, ones that resemble in many ways those used by myriad privatesector entities that hold even more sensitive personal data and access to
financial accounts.
Identity thieves exploit these inadequate security practices.
Exhortations to individuals to guard their data place the onus on the wrong
parties. No matter how careful people are, data is bound to leak out in
some form or another. We live in an information society, and it is virtually
impossible to go about daily life without giving out information to a wide
variety of people and entities. Documents with sensitive personal
information will be exposed in the trash. Not everyone will buy a shredder.
Nor will all purchase “firewalls” and other computer security software.
Even with additional precautions, SSNs will invariably be obtained under
certain circumstances.
Being secure requires individuals to take
cumbersome steps, and most will never take all the necessary precautions.
Even if they did, information could still be obtained by identity thieves.
yaledailynews.com/article.asp?AID=19454; Susan Cheever, A Tale of Ivy Rivalry Gone Awry,
NEWSDAY, July 31, 2002, at B2.
171. Jordan & Becker, supra note 171, at B2.
172. Tom Bell, Princeton Punishes Hacker of Yale Site, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 14, 2002, at 7.
173. Id.
174. Patrick Healy, Princeton Says Curiosity Led To Yale Files, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 14,
2002, at A2.
175. Id.
176. Id. The files of one student, Lauren Bush, the niece of President Bush, were accessed five
times.
177. Kelly Heyboer, Princeton University Decides Not to Fire Hackers, THE STAR LEDGER,
Aug. 14, 2002, at 15.
178. Cheever, supra note 170.

7/18/2003 12:18 PM

32

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54

Much of a person’s sensitive information is not exclusively in the hands of
that person—it is in the hands of various companies. Some are companies
that a person does business with, such as financial institutions and utility
companies. But others are ones that gather data about people without their
knowledge and consent. In other words, even if a person tries to keep her
SSN as confidential as possible, there are many entities that have it, and its
security depends upon how carefully these entities protect it. Frequently,
these entities sell it to whomever is willing to pay a small fee.
The disclosure of personal information such as SSNs, birth dates, and
mother’s maiden names would not expose people to identity theft if this
data were not used by companies as a way to verify identity. An identity
thief has an easy time engaging in massive fraud given the lax security of
most private sector companies.179 For example, in one instance, an identity
thief routinely found lost wallets or took discarded documents from
customers at his former job. Armed with victims’ SSNs, the culprit would
apply for in-store instant credit at a variety of stores such as Sears, Circuit
City, and Apple Computer Stores. Despite the fact that the identity thief
was 47 years old, he used the identifying information of an 83-year old
man, and was readily approved by a store clerk running an instant credit
check.180 As this example demonstrates, the problem emerges from the
lack of care in granting credit. Banks and institutions are in a rush to grant
credit, as illustrated by the fact that banks send out 3 billion pre-approved
credit card mailings every year.181
Private-sector entities are not the only institutions without adequate
controls on information security; government agencies are also deficient.
For example, there have been instances where identity thieves readily
obtained driver’s licenses in the names of their victims.182
Identity thieves, then, are only one of the culprits in identity theft.
The government and private-sector entities bear a significant amount of
responsibility, yet this is cloaked in the conception of identity theft as a
discrete crime that the victim could have prevented had she exercised more
care over her personal data. Identity theft does not merely happen; rather,
it is manufactured by a legally constructed architecture.

179. One commentator aptly notes that financial institutions are partly to blame in identity
theft cases because they may not keep customer data confidential, and he suggests that courts
hold them liable under a theory of breach of duty of confidentiality. See Brandon McKelvey,
Financial Institutions’ Duty of Confidentiality to Keep Personal Information Secure from the
Threat of Identity Theft, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1077, 1122–23 (2001). Although recognizing that
the problem stems from the private sector institutions, the solution still focuses on forms of
individual remedies rather than architectural solutions.
180. See Dave Orrick, 47-Year Old Man Poses as 83-Year-Old in Financial Identity Theft
Scheme, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Aug. 16, 2002, at 1.
181. Nowhere to Turn, supra note 76, at 13.
182. See Don Oldenburg, Identity Theft and Other Scams, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1997, at D5;
Bog Egelko, Identity-theft Victim Loses DMV Suit, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Apr. 13, 2002, at A15.
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Further, the architecture contributes to the harm caused to victims of
identity theft. Identity theft plunges people into a bureaucratic nightmare.
The identity theft injury to victims is often caused by the frustration and
sense of helplessness in attempting to stop and repair the damage caused by
the identity thief. Victims experience profound difficulty in dealing with
credit reporting agencies183 and often find recurring fraudulent entries on
their credit reports even after contacting the agencies.184 Identity theft laws
do not adequately regulate the bureaucratic system that injures victims.
Identity theft exposes the indifference of the bureaucracies controlling
personal information to the welfare of the individuals to whom the
information pertains.
The traditional model does not recognize identity theft as being
constructed by the law and the under-regulated security practices of
bureaucracies. Therefore, the prevailing approach continues to focus on
the thieves and on how individuals can protect themselves, despite the fact
that many thieves are not caught and people cannot protect themselves
from identity theft. Identity theft can be prevented if we reform the
architecture. It is to this issue that I now turn.

IV. Forging a New Architecture
If we see the problem architecturally, we see an architecture of
vulnerability, one with large holes, gaps, and weak spots. The harm is
caused by the very structure itself. Living in a dilapidated structure—a
building with flimsy walls, no locks, peepholes, inadequate fire protection,
and no emergency exits—is harmful, even without a disaster occurring.
Modern society is built on expectations—that we will be kept secure, that
our money will not be stolen, that our homes will not be invaded, that we
will be protected against violence. It is difficult to imagine how we could
maintain a free society if we did not have protection against rape, assault,
murder, and theft. If these protections are inadequate, there is harm even
without being victimized. People live with greater fear, they stop going
places, they restrict what they do, and they alter how they live.
Effective safety is thus partly a design question. According to Neal
Katyal, physical architecture can be proactive in combating crime, for it
can prevent crime. For example, “cleanliness and aesthetic appeal” can
make people perceive that a place is safe and orderly, and make people less
likely to disrupt the place.185 In a similar manner, the architecture of
information flows can be redesigned to prevent identity theft and
ameliorate its effects. Identity theft is the product of an architecture that
creates vulnerability and insecurity. The most effective way to combat
identity theft is to reconstruct this faulty architecture.
183. VACCA, supra note 70, at 54.
184. Nowhere to Turn, supra note 76, at 6–7.
185. Katyal, Supra note 54, at 1066.
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The recognition that identity theft is the product of architecture and is
best dealt with architecturally is an important first step, for it focuses the
debate on the most relevant issues and concerns. But difficult steps remain.
What should an appropriate architecture that protects against identity theft
look like? In the remainder of this article, I will explore architectural
solutions to identity theft.
A.

The Problem With Identification Systems

One of the predominant types of architectural solutions that have been
proposed for resolving the problem of identity theft is the creation of a
national identification system. For example, Amitai Etzioni proposes a
mandatory system of national identification.186 Etzioni advocates the use of
a universal identification card that is linked to a database of personal
information.187 He recommends the use of biometric identification, which
relies upon unique physical and behavioral characteristics, such as hand
prints, iris and retina patterns, and facial appearance.188 This system of
identification would replace SSNs with a more reliable identifier, one that
would make it harder for identity thieves to fraudulently impersonate their
victims.
Although a system of national identification, if administered in a
reliable manner, could curtail the problem of identity theft, it creates more
problems than it will solve. Etzioni severely underestimates the dangers of
creating a national identification system. As Richard Sobel observes,
“[i]dentity systems and documents have a long history of uses and abuses
for social control and discrimination.”189 Identification tools have been
used by governments for rounding up disfavored people.190 Etzioni
contends, however, that identification systems do not “transform
democratic societies into totalitarian ones. Totalitarian governments do not
creep up on the trials of measures such as identification cards; they arise in
response to breakdowns in the social order.”191
Although an identification system is not necessarily a catalyst for
totalitarianism, such a system is a powerful device that can be used by the
government in abusive ways. For example, the Japanese-American
Internment during World War II, in which over 100,000 citizens were

186. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 103–37 (1999).
187. See id. at 113.
188. See id. at 115.
189. Richard Sobel, The Degradation of Political Identity Under a National Identification
System, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 37, 48 (2002).
190. Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1143
(2000) (“One factor that enabled the Nazis to efficiently round up, transport, and seize assets of
Jews (and others they viewed as ‘undesirables’) was the extensive repositories of personal data
available not only from the public sector but also from private sector sources.”).
191. ETZIONI, supra note 186, at 127.
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imprisoned in camps,192 depended upon the government’s ability to identify
citizens of Japanese descent.193 Additionally, identification systems often
expand beyond their initial purposes, as evidenced by the widespread
expansion of the use of SSNs.194 Beyond abuses, identification systems are
far from foolproof, and one of the dangers of biometric identification is its
permanent connection to the individual. A digital thumbprint, for example,
can be stolen. If a password falls into the wrong hands, it can be changed;
one’s thumbprint cannot.195 In short, a national identification system will
pose significant dangers that may outweigh the benefits in reducing identity
theft.
Lynn LoPucki recommends a different form of national identification
system. LoPucki’s profound contribution to the debate over identity theft
is his recognition that identity theft stems from problems in identification
which emerge with creditors, credit reporting agencies, and other entities
using SSNs and personal data as passwords. LoPucki contends that the
problem of identity theft can be solved by devising a better system of
identification. He disfavors identity cards as a solution because they can be
readily lost and forged.196 LoPucki’s proposed identification system would
allow people to “publicly register their identities and publicly provide
information for contacting and identifying them.”197 The system would
enable people to register their identities, provide identification information,
and choose from certain standard sets of instructions to potential creditors
for identifying them.198 This system would be administered by a
government agency.199
Participation would be optional.200
The
government agency would maintain the database of identification
information, which would consist of various pieces of information people
submit such as biometric identifying characteristics, photographs, height,
drivers’ license numbers, personal data, and so on.201 LoPucki would
restrict the use of SSNs as passwords, and SSNs would be publicly
displayed on the website.202 Instead of using SSNs for identification,
192. ERIC. K. YAMAMOTO, ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATIONS: LAW AND THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 39 (2001). See also Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese
American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945); Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain:
Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941 (1999).
193.WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 138 (1998); see also DAVID BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE
COMPUTER STATE 24 (1983).
194. See supra Part III.C.
195. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS AND LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED
WORLD 144 (2000).
196. LoPucki, supra note 80, at 110–11.
197. Id. at 134.
198. See id. at 114–35.
199. See id. at 115–16.
200. See id. at 114.
201. See id. at 117–18.
202. See id. at 119–20.

7/18/2003 12:18 PM

36

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54

creditors must consult the website which contains each person’s
instructions for how to make the identification.203 Creditors failing to do so
would “lose their statutory exemption from liability for false reporting.”204
LoPucki’s solution is clever and creative. One laudatory aspect of the
system is that it allows people to participate in how they are identified.205
The system provides people with a limited form of engagement over one
aspect of their privacy—their identification.
Unfortunately, despite his great contribution toward understanding the
problem of identity theft, LoPucki’s solution suffers from the same
problems as the traditional model. It relies too heavily upon the initiative
of individuals. The system places the onus on the individual to set up an
account, which requires a personal appearance. Many individuals may not
be computer-savvy enough to access and monitor the website. Although it
does establish a system which can assist those who decide to utilize it,
LoPucki concedes that “most [people] are not likely to participate.”206 As a
result, it would function as little more than a band-aid solution. Identity
thieves could concentrate their efforts on the vast majority of people who
do not participate in the system. Of course, the system could be made to be
mandatory, but then it would become oppressive.
Additionally, I believe that LoPucki’s solution will ultimately cause
more problems than it will solve. First, it depends upon the government
maintaining individuals’ personal information. The government has had
significant security issues with its websites in the past, and government
websites have been hacked numerous times. There is no guarantee that
LoPucki’s government agency will have better data security practices than
other government agencies.
Second, the website consisting of identifying information would be
publicly accessible to all: “Read-only access to the website would be
unrestricted.”207 This would widely expose this information, which could
be abused in other contexts. LoPucki’s focus is on creditors and credit
reporting agencies, but identification can be used by a multitude of other
entities for a host of other purposes. Some people do not want their address
and other contact information to be publicly displayed. They may be
attempting to hide from abusive spouses, stalkers, and others. LoPucki
counters that people who desire to conceal their location could use only
email addresses,208 but location can still be traced. As LoPucki notes, the
person must establish an email account through a national provider and
must install software to detect web bugs (hidden code in emails that can
203. See id. at 119.
204. Id. at 114.
205. See id. at 118–19.
206. Id. at 114.
207. Id. at 117.
208. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Did Privacy Cause Identity Theft?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. ___, p.20
(2003); [hereinafter LoPucki II].
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obtain personal data from one’s computer).209 The requirement that people
take these steps is another way in which LoPucki’s system would
disadvantage those who are not computer-savvy.
Third, the public disclosure of SSNs will increase the use of the
number to link up records about people. Although it is certainly true that
SSNs are readily obtained, the availability of SSNs in this central database
will enable entities maintaining data systems to more effectively and
thoroughly gather SSNs, which function to connect various personal
information record systems together. As I have discussed elsewhere at
length, there are significant problems with the growing aggregation of
personal information by private sector entities.210
Furthermore, address information could be readily snatched up by
database companies. LoPucki anticipates this problem and states that the
website data should be “‘seeded’ with information that can be traced back
to the website as its source.”211 An example of such seeding, LoPucki
suggests, is that “the account owner might deliberately misspell words,
alter capitalization, or abbreviate terms.”212 However, it is unclear whether
many individuals have the sophistication to concoct creative attempts to
seed their information. Even if the database were successfully seeded, this
might not prevent entities from abroad from misusing the information, and
these entities may be difficult to prosecute.
B.

A New Architecture: Participation and Responsibility

I propose an architecture that establishes controls over the data
security practices of institutions and that affords people greater
participation in the uses of their information. The foundations should be
formed by the Fair Information Practices, which, as Marc Rotenberg aptly
observes, create an architecture for the handling and use of personal
information.213 The Fair Information Practices originate with a 1973 report
by the U.S. Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare. The report
recommended the passage of a code of Fair Information Practices:
There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose very
existence is secret.
There must be a way for an individual to find out what information
about him is in a record and how it is used.
There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about
him obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for
other purposes without his consent.

209. See Id. at 20.
210. See generally, Solove, Privacy, supra note 25.
211. LoPucki, supra note 80, at 131.
212. Id.
213. See generally, Marc Rotenberg, What Larry Doesn’t Get: Fair Information Practices and
the Architecture of Privacy, 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2001).
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There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of
identifiable information about him.
Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating
records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the
data for their intended use and must take reasonable precautions to
prevent misuse of the data.214

Subsequently, in 1980, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) established guidelines for the protection of
privacy.215 The OECD guidelines, building upon the HEW report,
recommended eight principles: (1) collection limitation—data should be
collected lawfully with the individual’s consent; (2) data quality—data
should be relevant to a particular purpose and be accurate; (3) purpose
specification—the purpose for data collection should be stated at the time
of the data collection and the use of the data should be limited to this
purpose; (4) use limitation—data should not be disclosed for different
purposes without the consent of the individual; (5) security safeguards—
data should be protected by reasonable safeguards; (6) openness
principle—individuals should be informed about the practices and polices
of those handling their personal information; (7) individual participation—
people should be able to learn about the data that an entity possesses about
them and to rectify errors or problems in that data; (8) accountability—the
entities that control personal information should be held accountable for
carrying out these principles.216
Paul Schwartz, Marc Rotenberg, Joel Reidenberg, and others have
long contended that the Fair Information Practices represent the most
effective foundation for the protection of privacy in the Information Age.217
As Schwartz observes:
A distillation of fair information principles should be made around four
requirements: (1) defined obligations that limit the use of personal data;
(2) transparent processing systems; (3) limited procedural and
substantive rights; and (4) external oversight.218

The Fair Information Practices embody a particular understanding of
privacy and its protection. Understood broadly, the Fair Information
Practices establish an architecture that alters the power dynamic between
214. HEW 1973 REPORT, supra note 131, at 41.
215. Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
available at http://www1.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/PRIV-EN.htm. For a comparison of U.S.
privacy law to the OECD guidelines, see Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in
Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771 (1999).
216. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDELINES ON
THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA, (Feb. 2002),
available at http://www1.oecd.org.
217. See Schwartz, supra note 159, at 1667–1703; Rotenberg, supra note 213, at 36–50; see
generally, Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private
Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1995).
218. Schwartz, supra note 159, at 1671.
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individuals and the various bureaucracies that process their personal
information. The Fair Information Practices focus on two general
concerns: participation and responsibility. They aim to structure the
information economy so that people can participate meaningfully in the
collection and use of their personal information. This does not necessarily
mean that people are afforded dominion over their personal information;
rather, people are to be kept informed about the information gathered about
them and the purposes of its use; and people must have some say in the
way their information is processed. In other words, the Fair Information
Practices aim to increase individual involvement in personal information
systems.
Additionally, the Fair Information Practices bring information
processing under better control. Currently, as I have discussed at great
length elsewhere, information processing is out of control.219 Companies
collecting and using personal information are often doing so in careless
ways with little concern for the welfare of the individuals to whom the
information pertains. The Fair Information Practices recognize that
personal data processors have special responsibilities and that they must be
regulated in order to ensure that they maintain accurate and secure records
and use and disseminate information responsibly.
The Fair Information Practices are a foundation. They are general
principles, and they establish the broad goals for information privacy
protection. At the most basic level, the Fair Information Practices place the
burden of addressing the identity theft problem on the entities that cause
it—the entities using personal information. The effectiveness of the Fair
Information Practices depends upon how they are applied to particular
privacy problems and how they are enforced. In what follows, I will
discuss how the two general aims of the Fair Information Practices—
participation and responsibility—can be implemented to help grapple with
the identity theft problem.
(1) Participation

First, the architecture should allow people to have greater participation
in the collection and use of their personal information. Currently, people
lack knowledge about the information collected about them. Information
can be readily disseminated and transferred without a person’s knowledge
or consent. There are few requirements for how secure information must
be kept. There are rarely any limits as to whom information can be
disclosed. Information can be used for whatever purpose the entity
possessing it desires.
I recommend an architecture that requires entities gathering personal
information about people to keep individuals informed about their
information. The credit reporting system needs to be reformed. Currently,
219. See Solove, Privacy, supra note 25, at 1423–30.
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even with the FCRA, credit reporting agencies are not responsive enough
to the welfare of the people whose information they collect and
disseminate. For example, people should be allowed to regularly access
their credit reports for free.220 LoPucki criticizes this suggestion,
contending that increasing a person’s ability to access information held by
credit reporting agencies will also increase the identity thief’s ability to
gain access as well.221 To fix this difficulty, a more radical change in the
credit reporting system may be necessary. An opt-in regime to credit
reporting would significantly curtail problems of improper access to credit
records. Currently, credit reporting agencies need not establish any
relationship to the people they report on. In an opt-in regime, credit
reporting agencies would have to contact individuals and would be more
accountable for improper access to credit records. Individuals could access
their credit records through passwords or account numbers rather than by
supplying SSNs or other personal data.
When there is an unusual change in the behavior of a record subject,
such as when a person who regularly repays her loans suddenly starts
defaulting, credit reporting agencies should notify that person. The
architecture should empower people with an easy, quick, and convenient
way to challenge inaccuracies about their personal information as well as
fraudulent entries in their credit reports. Disputes can be resolved with a
special arbitration system that can function quickly and inexpensively
rather than resorting to expensive court proceedings.
If these measures are taken, victims will be able to discover more
quickly the existence of identity theft since they will be better informed
about the data collected about them and how it is being used.
(2)

Responsibility

The architecture should also be premised on the notion that the
collection and use of personal information is an activity that carries duties
and responsibilities. The architecture would establish specific measures of
control over entities maintaining systems of personal data. For example, if
an entity is providing background-check information about a person, that
entity should be held responsible for any inaccuracies or deficiencies in the
information. After all, the information is often used to determine whether a
person obtains a job, loan, or license. Currently, however, companies that
collect, disseminate, and use personal information do not have many
responsibilities and duties to the people to whom the information pertains.

220. In her testimony before Congress, Beth Givens recommended that “[a]ll consumers
should be able to receive one free copy of their credit report annually,” and noted that six states
have enacted this measure into law. See Givens, supra note 70, at 6 .
221. See LoPucki II, supra note 208, at 13–14.
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(a) Existing Accounts and Data Holders

To establish greater responsibility, the architecture would regulate
private sector security practices. For one, privacy policies often merely
state that data will be kept secure and safe, but these statements have little
meaning without more knowledge of what practices and measures are
employed. Because security is technical in nature, it is unlikely that many
people will be able to understand and evaluate the specific security
measures taken.
Minimum security practices must be established for handling people’s
personal information or accounts. An SSN, mother’s maiden name, and
birth date should be prohibited as the method by which access can be
obtained to accounts. This is one aspect of LoPucki’s solution that would
be quite helpful. However, instead of establishing an elaborate voluntary
public identification system as LoPucki suggests, identity theft can be
curtailed by companies maintaining customer accounts employing
alternative means of identification, such as passwords.
This solution does not come without difficulties. Passwords can be
easily forgotten or found out. One method is the use of multiple questions
and answers supplied by the customer at the time the account is created.
Customers supply the question and the answer. Questions can include
one’s favorite songs, places a person has visited, and so on. These
questions must vary from institution to institution, for standardized sets of
questions will result in identity thieves attempting to find out people’s
answers to those questions. With varying methods of identification, an
identity thief will no longer be able to use a few pieces of information to
access everything. This will eliminate the severity of the impact of identity
theft. The thief may be able to access one or two accounts, but not all of
them. Another problem is that so much personal information is maintained
by various database companies that a person’s answers may exist in these
databases. For example, a person might use as a password the name of her
college, spouse, pet, or child. This type of information should not be used
since it is readily available in databases.
Another problem that might arise is that databases will come to
include the types of information that people generally use for these
questions. This difficulty demonstrates the importance of thinking
architecturally. The problem of identity theft is part of a larger structure in
which companies are not effectively regulated in the collection, use, and
dissemination of personal information. If database companies are regulated
to prohibit the collection of certain types of information, then this data can
be better protected from falling into the hands of an identity thief. Further,
the companies maintaining accounts should use multiple series of questions
rather than just one question, as this decreases the odds that the identity
thief will have obtained all the necessary pieces of data.
Of course, this method of identification is far from foolproof. But the
level of sophistication and difficulty needed to carry out an identity theft
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would be increased. Identity theft will become harder because thieves will
no longer have easy access to all accounts through the use of a few pieces
of easy-to-find information such as SSNs. Additionally, identity theft can
be more readily halted. It is currently a difficult and cumbersome process
to change one’s SSN.222 A person cannot change her height, birth date, or
mother’s maiden name. But questions and answers or passwords can be
easily be changed. Thus, once discovered, identity theft will be easier to
stop and will not continue long after the victim becomes aware of it.
(b) New Accounts

The suggestions above concern access to already established accounts.
Much identity theft, however, occurs through the identity thief opening up
new accounts under the victim’s identity. Currently, it is far too easy to
establish a new account through the mail and the Internet.223 Pre-approved
credit card applications, for example, enable the recipient to easily establish
an account and change addresses. To halt this practice, credit card
companies should be required to meet with people in person when first
creating the account. This will make identity thieves more reluctant to
engage in fraud, as it will increase their chances of being caught. The
downside to this solution is its high cost. As LoPucki also notes, it is also
inconvenient for consumers.224
An alternative solution would be to require companies that want to
open a new account through the mail to verify a person’s address, date of
birth, and phone number with a credit reporting agency and then send
written confirmation both to the address that the applicant lists on her
application as well as to the address that the credit reporting agency has.
Further, the company should follow-up by calling the applicant’s telephone
number listed with the credit reporting agency. In the event of any
discrepancies in the information held by the credit reporting agency and the
individual, the individual should be notified.225 Many attempts at identity
theft can be halted if creditors take greater care at scrutinizing applications.
LoPucki contends that even with this notification system, the identity
thief can still intercept the notification.226 While this is certainly possible,
it requires additional steps to carry out the identity theft, ones that can
increase the chances of the thief getting caught.
The solutions discussed above are only recommendations of the types
of solutions that can be employed once we recognize that we need to focus
222. See Linda Foley, Fact Sheet 17(L): Should I Change My Social Security Number? (May
2002), at http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs171-ssn.htm.
223. Billions of pre-approved credit offers are made to consumers each year, and there is
vigorous competition among creditors to find new customers. See Givens, supra note 70, at 2.
224. See LoPucki II, supra note 208, at 12.
225. Of course, this solution would only work well if people had greater participation in the
collection and use of their information by credit reporting agencies.
226. See LoPucki II, supra note 208, at 13.
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on architecture. Viewing identity theft under the traditional model has
diverted needed attention from these architectural concerns. If the
architecture recognizes the responsibilities of companies maintaining
personal data, it will provide a strong incentive for companies to devise
creative solutions and better security.
(3) Foundations

These architectural solutions do not require a radical change in the
law. The foundations are already present, although much remains to be
built upon them. One such foundation is the Federal Trade Commission’s
(FTC) enforcement over privacy policies. Beginning in 1998, the FTC
began to bring actions against companies breaching their own privacy
policies as a violation of the FTC Act’s prohibition against “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”227 In many of its
actions thus far, the FTC has merely policed privacy policy promises. The
FTC’s view to enforcement has been to make practices match up to
promises. As a result, the FTC has been rather weak and reactive in its
enforcement of privacy policies.228 In a number of cases involving
companies engaging in blatant breaches of their own privacy policies, the
FTC has settled, requiring companies simply to stop the offending practices
and avoid making misrepresentations in the future.229
However, recently the FTC has begun to require greater security as
part of its settlements. In FTC v. EliLilly,230 a pharmaceutical company had
established an email service that sent emails to patients reminding them to
take the anti-depressant drug Prozac. Erroneously, the company sent out an
email message with the email addresses of all subscribers in the “To” line.
The FTC complaint alleged that Lilly failed to
provide appropriate training for its employees regarding consumer
privacy and information security; provide appropriate oversight and
assistance for the employee who sent out the e-mail, who had no prior
experience in creating, testing, or implementing the computer program
used; and implement appropriate checks and controls on the process,
227. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2002). An unfair or deceptive act or practice is one that “causes or
is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” 15
U.S.C. § 45(n) (2002). For a discussion of the rise of FTC privacy enforcement, see Steven
Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041 (2000).
228. For a discussion of FTC jurisprudence over privacy policies, see Jeff Sovern, Protecting
Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1305 (2001).
229. See, e.g., In re Liberty Financial Companies, F.T.C. No. 98-23522, (May 6, 1999)
(operator of website falsely promised that personal data collected from children and teens would
be kept anonymous); FTC v. ReverseAuction.com, Inc., F.T.C. No. 00-0032 (D. D.C. 2000)
(company improperly obtained personal information from eBay and used it to spam eBay
customers); In re GeoCities, F.T.C. No. C-3849 (Feb. 5, 1999) (website falsely promised that it
never provided information to others without customer permission).
230. F.T.C. No. 012-3214.
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such as reviewing the computer program with experienced personnel and
pretesting the program internally before sending out the e-mail.231

The FTC appropriately focused on security issues. Eli Lilly settled
and agreed to establish a new security program.232
Thus far, however, the FTC has been reactive, waiting for specific
harms to emerge before springing to action. A recent case involving
Microsoft Corporation will hopefully signal a shift toward a more proactive
solution. Microsoft’s .NET Passport is an online identification service that
maintains personal information of Internet users (such as email addresses,
gender, photographs, age, and interests) and allows users to use a single
username and password to access many different websites without having
to sign-on to each separately. Passport also provides a related service
called Wallet that enables users to enter credit card and billing data which
can then be used by multiple websites. In response to a complaint by a
group of privacy organizations led by the Electronic Privacy Information
Center, the FTC found on August 8, 2002, that Microsoft had violated the
FTC Act, and Microsoft and the FTC agreed on a settlement.233 Microsoft
had promised in its privacy policy that it protected Passport information
with “powerful online security technology,” but the FTC concluded that
Microsoft did not provide adequate security. As part of the settlement,
Microsoft must create a “comprehensive information security program”
and assess its security yearly. Further, it must make its documents about
security available to the FTC for five years.
An interesting aspect of the Microsoft Passport case is that, unlike the
Eli Lilly case and the other cases before the FTC, the security problems of
Microsoft’s Passport had not yet resulted in a major security breach.
Instead of waiting for specific harms to emerge, the FTC acted more
proactively in this case, recognizing that the harm existed in the
architecture.
Unfortunately, a weakness in the proposed settlement is that the
security measures do not go far enough. The consent order lacks
specificity about security. Indeed, the Electronic Privacy Information
Center recently commented on a number of security weaknesses that are
not addressed by the consent order.234
Another hopeful development is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act.
The GLB Act requires a number of agencies that regulate financial
institutions to promulgate “administrative, technical, and physical
231. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Eli Lilly Settles FTC Charges Concerning
Security Breach (Jan. 18, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/01/elililly.htm.
232. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 544–46
(2003).
233. See In the Matter of Microsoft Corp., F.T.C. No. 012-3240 (2002).
234. Comments of the Electronic Privacy Information Center et al., to the Federal Trade
Commission,
(Sept.
9, 2002),
at http://www.epic.org/privacy/consumer/Microsoft/
ordercomments.html.
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safeguards for personal information.”235 On February 1, 2001, several
agencies including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision issued
standards for safeguarding customer information.236 On May 23, 2002, the
FTC issued similar security standards.237 Pursuant to the FTC regulations,
financial institutions “shall develop, implement, and maintain a
comprehensive information security program” that is appropriate to the
“size and complexity” of the institution, the “nature and scope” of the
institution’s activities, and the “sensitivity of any customer information at
issue.”238 An information security program consists of “the administrative,
technical, or physical safeguards [institutions] use to access, collect,
distribute, process, store, use, transmit, dispose of, or otherwise handle
customer information.”239 The regulations set forth three objectives that a
security program should achieve:
(1) Insure the security and confidentiality of customer information;
(2) Protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or
integrity of such information; and
(3) Protect against unauthorized access to or use of such information that
could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.240

The GLB Act is on the right track in its focus on information security.
The GLB Act represents an attempt at an architectural solution to the
problem of information security. However, the regulations under the GLB
Act remain rather vague as to the specific level of security that is required
or what types of measures should be taken. The regulations require
institutions to designate personnel to “coordinate” the information security
program; and to “[i]dentify reasonably foreseeable internal and external
risks to the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer
These regulations establish rather broad obvious
information.”241
guidelines; they virtually ignore specifics.242 Of course, a rule that is too
detailed in the standards it required could end up being ineffective as well.
As Edward Janger and Paul Schwartz observe, “command-and-control
rules” which are detailed and inflexible, can “freeze development of

235. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b).
236. See 66 Fed. Reg. 8616 (Feb. 1, 2001).
237. See 67 Fed. Reg. 36,484 (May 23, 2002).
238. 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (2002).
239. 16 C.F.R. § 314.2(c) (2002).
240. 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2002).
241. 16 C.F.R. § 314.4 (2002).
242. For a good list of specific information handling practices, see Utility Consumers’ Action
Network & Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Fact Sheet 12: Responsible Information-Handling
(May 2002), available at http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs12-ih2.htm.
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technologies and discourage recourse to less costly alternatives.”243 Janger
and Schwartz are correct that such regulations, if too specific, can quickly
become obsolete, discourage innovation, and be costly and inefficient.
However, rules that are too open-ended and vague can end up being
toothless. Although security standards must not be overly specific, they
must contain meaningful minimum requirements.
Ultimately, the strength of the GLB Act’s security protections will
depend upon how they are enforced. If enforced with an understanding of
architecture, the GLB Act has the potential to go far in reforming security
practices. However, even if the GLB Act is enforced in this manner, the
Act applies only to financial institutions. A law requiring security
procedures must encompass all institutions that process personal
information.
Despite these new security provisions, companies continue to maintain
lax security procedures for the access of financial accounts and other
personal data. Thus far, the FTC’s efforts have been somewhat anemic.
With vigorous enforcement, security practices can change. But it remains
uncertain whether the FTC and other agencies will undertake such a
vigorous enforcement effort.

V. Conclusion
Understanding certain privacy problems as architectural—such as
identity theft—demonstrates that protecting privacy involves more than
protecting against isolated infractions. It is about establishing a particular
social structure, one that ensures individual participation in the collection
and use of personal information and responsibilities for entities that control
that data. In a regime with suitable architecture, individual remedies will
be far more effective. The problem of identity theft may never be
completely eradicated, but in a world with the appropriate architecture, its
prevalence and negative effects will be significantly curtailed.

243. Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information
Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1255 (2002).

